editorials
Mr. Biden, Define Antisemitism
P resident Joe Biden’s heart is in the right place in the
fight against antisemitism. He has been forceful in
his condemnation of the deep-seated hate that drives
antisemitism, he has shown compassion toward its victims
and he has made clear his administration’s commitment
to structure an “ambitious” and “comprehensive” plan to
address antisemitism.

Biden has used all the right words. For example, he has
promised that “hate will not win” and referred to the rising
tide of antisemitism as “a stain on the soul of America.”
He has also delivered on many of his antisemitism-
related promises, like increased federal funding to
help secure Jewish institutions and the appointment
of an ambassador-level special envoy to monitor and
combat antisemitism.

So why is it that the much-ballyhooed White House
national antisemitism strategy is having difficulty defining
antisemitism? The most widely accepted working definition of
antisemitism is the one developed by the International
Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. That definition is
simple, straightforward and clear: “Antisemitism is a
certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed
as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical
manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish
or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward
Jewish community institutions and religious facilities.”
The IHRA definition has been adopted or endorsed by
1,116 global entities, including 42 independent nations,
30 U.S. states, seven Canadian provinces, numerous
U.S. cities and counties and a host of national and
international organizations. But the Biden administration
is facing pressure from some on the left to use a different
definition of antisemitism, or none at all, out of fear that
the IHRA definition ― which identifies some forms of
anti-Zionism as antisemitism ― does not leave sufficient
space for critique of Israel and could violate the right of
free speech.

Israel is not mentioned in the IHRA definition. But it
does figure prominently in the non-binding “illustrations”
that accompany the working definition: “Denying the
Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by
claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist
endeavor,” is one example. It points to the fact that
anti-Zionism is often used to cloak antisemitism. And that
is unquestionably true.

For us, the debate is a distraction. Nothing in the IHRA
definition limits or restricts legitimate, civil, non-Jew-
baiting criticism of Israel. We have seen that to be
the case in vivid color over the past several months.

Thus, notwithstanding the uniform adoption of the IHRA
definition across the world, there has been no chill in
the criticism of the Israeli government and its planned
judicial overhaul or other protests against the Netanyahu
government. All without a whiff of antisemitism.

Opponents of Israel are free to criticize Israel all they
want. They can criticize its leaders. They may criticize
its policies. They can criticize its actions. They may even
criticize its food and its music. They just can’t do any of
that by invoking antisemitic arguments, images, tropes
or hate.

If anti-Zionists can’t be critical of Israel without being
antisemitic, that’s their problem. But any strategy to
fight antisemitism needs a clear definition of exactly
what it is fighting. The IHRA working definition is the
gold standard. ■
I n the runup to last week’s much anticipated presidential
elections in Turkey, press reports focused on the prospect
that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s two-decade-long
iron grip on leadership, and his increasingly autocratic
style of governance, might be replaced.

The reports highlighted the popularity of the candidacy
of a kinder, gentler leader named Kemal Kilicdaroglu, who
promised to bolster the country’s democracy, stabilize its
economy, reduce tensions with foreign allies and return
to consensus leadership rather than the centralized
decision-making favored by Erdogan.

The May 15 election results didn’t match the hype.

Erdogan got 49.5% of the vote, Kilicdaroglu got 44.9%
and a third candidate, Sinan Ogan, got 5.2%. Since no
candidate crossed the 50% threshold needed to win,
a runoff election between the two top vote-getters
is scheduled for May 28. And because Ogan’s right-
wing supporters will likely vote for Erdogan in the
runoff, Erdogan is projected to win with close to a
double-digit margin.

Erdogan has a long history of political success. He first
gained national prominence as the mayor of Istanbul,
the country’s most populous city, and used that post
as a springboard to the position of prime minister
and then president.

In the ensuing years, he has become a deeply polarizing
figure who has been accused of diluting democracy by
10 MAY 25, 2023 | JEWISH EXPONENT
using repressive tactics against civil society and the media
while concentrating power in his presidency. Critics are
concerned with the poor state of the Turkish economy,
marked by high inflation, as well as the government’s
weak response to devastating earthquakes that killed
more than 50,000 people in Turkey and neighboring
Syria. Supporters say that Erdogan has modernized the
country through massive infrastructure projects and that
he has brought Islam back into public life in Turkey.

And then there is the sometimes confusing and fluid
foreign policy component of Erdogan’s rule. Through
NATO and other historic relations Turkey has been allied
with the West. But there are holes in that alliance. While
Erdogan condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and
sent aid to the Ukrainian government, he refused to join
Western sanctions on Russia and instead expanded trade
ties with Russia and drew closer to Russian President
Vladimir Putin.

Erdogan has also sparred with the United States over
Syria policy and regularly disparages Washington in
his public speeches. And although Turkey is a NATO
member state, Erdogan has used his NATO blackball vote
to hamper the alliance’s expansion by delaying Finland’s
ability to join and refusing to accept Sweden.

Kilicdaroglu promised to improve relations with the
West and make Turkish foreign policy less personal. That
potential breath of fresh perspective is not likely to occur.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey
Instead, Erdogan will remain in power. He will further
tighten his control in Turkey as he sews uncertainty in the
West and further cultivates his associations with other
authoritarian regimes.

What that means for what appeared to be improving
Turkish-Israel relations is unclear, as the Jewish state will
join other Western powers as they wait to see Erdogan’s
next steps following what is likely to be a significant
reelection victory next week. ■
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Erdogan, Yet Again