editorials
L ast Thursday came reports of a three-
pronged Saudi proposal to the U.S. of
its “terms” for normalizing relations with
Israel: a security agreement of some kind
with the United States, endorsement of a
civilian nuclear program in Saudi Arabia and
decreased restrictions on U.S. arms sales
to the Saudis. The Saudi demands are not
realistic. But the proposal was seen as an
opening for further discussion.

As a result, Thursday’s chatter was all about
the cost versus the benefi t of the proposed
“terms” and the impact of the Saudis joining
fellow Gulf states and other Arab countries in
In this photo released by Xinhua news agency, from left,
making peace with Israel — thereby creating
Saudi national security adviser Musaad bin Mohammed
a more united front against expansionist Iran,
al-Aiban; Wang Yi, China's most senior diplomat; and Ali
and assuring a continuation of Israel’s integra-
Shamkhani, the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security
Council, in Beijing on March 10
tion into the region. For Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu, normalization with the
Saudis and further tipping the balance of power against of states and noninterference in their internal aff airs.”
Iran would be a crowning foreign policy achievement.

The Iran-Saudi Arabia rapprochement is a potential
That was Thursday. Then on Friday, in a head-spinning game changer. It left pundits and diplomats struggling
development, Iran and Saudi Arabia announced they to determine the biggest takeaway. The consensus
will reestablish diplomatic relations in a deal brokered seems to be the emergence of China as the lead broker
by China. The two Mideast rivals have been fi ghting in the detente agreement, with the Xi government
proxy wars for years in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. moving to the role of power player in the region, having
But they are now declaring a truce, and plan to reopen successfully taken advantage of the diplomatic vacuum
embassies in Tehran and Riyadh in two months. Both created by current U.S. policy in the Gulf. While the U.S.

countries have pledged “respect for the sovereignty is evaluating the diplomatic consequences of the deal,
it leaves Israel wondering where it fi ts in, and how
it is supposed to navigate an alliance between
its most vaunted adversary and its most coveted
potential partner.

Initial public reactions in Washington and
Jerusalem were predictable. The Biden
administration welcomed the reestablishment of
diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and
Iran and had little to say about Beijing’s role in
bringing the two back together. But below the
surface fi ngers are being pointed at failed U.S.

leadership in the region and concern about China’s
enhanced diplomatic stature and mounting
infl uence. In Jerusalem, the disappointment over
the joining of Iran and the Saudis on any level was
palpable, even as Israel anticipates continued
behind-the-scenes diplomatic and economic
discussions with the Saudis.

No one is sure what comes next. After decades
of competition and confrontation between Saudi
Arabia and Iran, there are real questions regarding the
viability of the planned rapprochement. The Sunnis of
Riyadh and the Shiites of Tehran still have deep and
visceral diff erences, and the historic animosities could
be kindled by the slightest misstep on either side.

While a cautious wait-and-see approach makes
sense across the board, there is no escaping the fact
that there has been a shift in the balance of the political
reality of the Middle East. That’s a big deal. ■
Progeny of the Taylor Force Act
T he bipartisan Taylor Force Act was signed into
law by former President Donald Trump in 2018. It
directs the U.S. government to stop aid payments to
the Palestinian Authority as long as the PA continues
to pay stipends to individuals (or the families of
individuals) who commit acts of terror. The bill was
named in honor of Taylor Force, a West Point graduate
who served tours of duty in Afghanistan and Iraq, who
was murdered by a Palestinian terrorist in 2016 while
he was visiting Israel as part of a university study group.

Shortly after the passage of the Taylor Force Act, the
Trump administration froze fi nancial aid to the PA and
halted funding for UNRWA and the USAID offi ce for the
West Bank and Gaza. In 2021, the Biden administration
announced that it was resuming aid to the Palestinians
for U.N. relief eff orts, for economic aid to the West
Bank and Gaza and for peacebuilding programs. Those
payments do not violate the Taylor Force Act since they
are sent to organizations other than the PA.

Notwithstanding the Taylor Force Act, and a similar
2018 law passed by the Israeli Knesset that requires
12 MARCH 16, 2023 | JEWISH EXPONENT
Israel to deduct the amount paid to Palestinian
prisoners and families of terrorists from the tax revenue
that Israel sends to the PA under the Oslo Accords, the
PA’s pay-for-slay program continues.

Last week, independent eff orts were initiated in
the U.S. Senate and the Knesset to address ongoing
PA sponsorship of terror activity. These eff orts were
in partial response to the rash of deadly Palestinian
terror attacks that have left 14 Israelis dead since the
beginning of the year, including the recent killing of
American Israeli citizen Elan Ganeles.

In the U.S., Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.) announced
his intention to reintroduce the Taylor Force Martyr
Payment Prevention Act that targets foreign banks
that are used as part of the PA process for pay-to-slay
“martyr payments” by restricting banks that facilitate
such payments or provide services to Hamas from
doing business in the U.S. or with U.S. dollars. And in
Israel, MK Yitzhak Pindrus of the United Torah Judaism
Party off ered legislation to enable terror victims to
sue the PA for injuries and losses resulting from terror
attacks and to collect any judgment amounts directly
from the tax money frozen by Israel under its 2018
Taylor Force Act-inspired law. Under the current law,
the tax funds are held by Israel and not available for
any purpose.

The Cotton bill (and a companion House bill by
Rep. Doug Lamborn (R-Colo.) was fi rst introduced
in 2017 but was not brought for a vote in either the
House or the Senate. The fate of Cotton’s new eff ort
is uncertain. The Pindrus bill, however, is reported to
have signifi cant Knesset support from both coalition
and opposition lawmakers.

We applaud the Pindrus bill and its objective of
expanding meaningful fi nancial recovery opportunities
for terror victims, and we encourage strong
consideration of the Cotton bill. We support eff orts
to bring ever-increasing pressure on the PA and its
leadership to abandon the incendiary pay-for-slay
martyr program. If the PA genuinely wants peace it
needs to do everything in its power to stop terror
activity rather than reward it. ■
Luo Xiaoguang / Xinhua News Agency/Newscom
The Saudi Surprise