opinion
The Emerging Unholy Alliance
Between Russia, Turkey and Iran
BY AMIR AVIVI
L ess than a week after U.S.

President Joe Biden left
the Middle East following a visit
that focused on the informal
Israeli-Sunni Arab alliance in
the region, Russian President
Vladimir Putin boarded a plane
to Iran, the leader of the opposing Shi’ite axis.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey
joined the summit in Tehran.

The three regimes represented in Tehran are
not friends of the West.

Russia is engaged in a brutal war against
Ukraine and dishes out threats to European
countries on a weekly basis. Iran funds terrorist
proxies across the Middle East, has a robust
nuclear weapons project and has stated many
times that it seeks the complete annihilation of
the United States and Israel. Finally, Turkey has
proven itself an unreliable partner of the West
on core issues such as sanctions on Russia,
use of Russian defense systems, support for
malign Iranian activities and more.

Putin’s summit has worrying implications for
the Middle East. It appears that an anti-American
alliance is forming at the behest of Russia and
Mandorf Continued from Page 13
alone may seem reasonable, but when combined
with our data showing that most also see support
for Israel as a reason for antisemitism, and a sizable
minority (20%) do not equate anti-Israel behavior with
antisemitic behavior — a claim made by many anti-Is-
rael organizations and individuals — what “support”
actually means is unclear.

This finding is consistent with the conflict some
see between support for Jewish nationalism in
Israel, namely Zionism, and aversion to the concept
of seeing Jews as a whole as a national identity, or
as noted by James Loeffler, “the obvious presence
of Jewish nationalism in America coupled with the
putative absence of a Jewish nation.”
Gol Kalev touches on how anti-Jewish behavior is
expressed today in his conceptualization of “Judaism
3.0,” where he posits the transformation of Judaism
from a more religious element to a more national
one (as in Zionism). As societies have evolved, so
has the expression of anti-Jewish behavior. As
Judaism has moved more into the national realm
with the establishment of Israel, so has anti-Jewish
behavior. Our data show that a sizable portion of
16 JULY 28, 2022 | JEWISHEXPONENT.COM
China, and it includes Iran and its terrorist proxies.

As a result, Iran could soon find itself comfortably
exporting oil and weapons and attracting foreign
investments, despite Western sanctions. It might
well become self-sufficient within its bloc of allies,
leaving the West unable to pressure Iran on its
nuclear program and other malfeasances.

U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan
revealed last week that Iran already feels
emboldened enough to send sophisticated
weapons systems to Russia. Putin said last
week in Tehran that Russia-Iran relations “are
developing at a good pace,” adding that the
countries can “boast of record figures in terms
of trade growth, including the strengthening of
cooperation on international security issues.”
Such statements are made by leaders who are
completely undeterred by the West.

When asked about the possibility of advanced
Iranian weapons being sold to Russia, U.S.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said this week,
“We would advise Iran to not do that.” He added:
“We think that’s a really, really bad idea.”
This is not enough. When Iran is emboldened
enough to transfer sophisticated UAVs to Russia
and attempt to bring Turkey into its orbit, the
West must see Iran for what it is and what it is
attempting to do: conquer the region in the name
of the Islamic revolution. Iranian leaders say this
on a daily basis. We need only listen.

Iran must be made to understand that it cannot
continue to expand its influence and aggression
in the region, detach Turkey from the Western
orbit or find new ways to evade Western sanc-
tions. Right now, it seems that, even if these
messages are being sent by the West, Tehran
doesn’t particularly care.

The best way to make Iran care is by creating a
strong and concrete alliance against the axis Iran is
attempting to build. The U.S. is already the leader of
the bloc opposing Iran, and it must do all it can, in
cooperation with its many allies, to stop Iran’s aggres-
sion in the region, as well as its nuclear program.

Finally, just like Eastern European countries
faced with Russian aggression in their region,
Israel cannot be expected to remain passive
in the face of Iranian aggression in the Middle
East. Israel must be prepared to use all means
at its disposal to stop this aggression and
ensure its own security. JE
people, including Jews, see a separation between
anti-Jewish and anti-Israel behavior, even though a
much lower amount calls for an unconditional sepa-
ration from actual support for Israel.

So, it is possible to claim no apparent or stated
objection to the Jewish “religion” while express-
ing anti-Jewish attitudes through objection to the
Jewish national entity, namely Israel. By deny-
ing a Jewish connection to nationhood, one can
declare immunity from charges of antisemitism.

Both secular and religious Jewish and non-Jewish
“anti-Zionists” have made and debated that claim.

By institutionalizing the separation between reli-
gious and national definitions of Judaism, “nation-
al”-based anti-Jewish behavior is given a free pass
and can claim not to be antisemitic, as we see in
statements made by the BDS movement.

All this only amplifies the striking finding in our
data regarding the widespread lack of awareness
among Americans, including Jewish Americans, of
any specific programs or efforts targeting antisem-
itism. This is despite the stated concern regarding
antisemitism from Jewish organizations. While many
Jewish and Israeli advocacy organizations claim to
undertake these efforts, the impact on public con-
sciousness remains low. We cannot offer a definitive
explanation for why this is so, but one possibility
that needs to be considered is that if such programs
exist, they are not effectively applied in practice or
carried out as efficiently as they should be.

As noted earlier, the interpretation of data is vari-
able, but the data themselves are not. Our respon-
dents were anonymous, which may account for the
open expression of sentiment that is not always
acceptable in some social circles — for example,
among those who may self-identify as “liberal.”
Anonymity can sometimes create the opposite
problem in survey research; for example, if group
sentiment is present to intentionally mislead, as
claimed in the case of Israeli elections. Our sam-
ples had no such motivation, and the consistency
of their responses would lead one to conclude that
they are, in fact, both valid and reliable. As such,
this research is agnostic towards the data and
ultimately apolitical, representing neither a “right-
wing” nor “left-wing” orientation or analysis. JE
Brig. Gen. (Res.) Amir Avivi is the founder and
CEO of the Israel Defense and Security Forum,
which promotes research, education and policy
focused on Israel’s security as a cornerstone of
its existence.

Irwin J. (Yitzchak) Mansdorf is a clinical psychol-
ogist and a fellow at the Jerusalem Center for
Public Affairs specializing in political psychology.

This is an edited version of an article published
by the center.