opinion
We Must Prepare for
a Nuclear Iran
Joseph Epstein
Yagnik / AdobeStock
F or all intents and purposes, the Iranian nuclear
deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, is
dead. In December, Iranian offi cials said they had doubled
their capacity to enrich uranium. International Atomic
Energy Agency monitoring cameras were shut down
by the regime last May, and IAEA inspectors have
been banned from checking on the program. IAEA
offi cials say Iran has enriched 154 pounds of uranium to
60% purity. According to the head of the IAEA, Rafael
Grossi, that is enough to produce several weapons.

Iran can now enrich its uranium stockpile to 90%,
which is weapons-grade, within a few weeks. After
that, the regime only needs to place the enriched
uranium in a warhead and run a nuclear test to join the
league of nuclear rogue states like Russia and North
Korea. Barring a full-scale invasion of the country, or an
extremely unlikely coup or revolution, this will happen.

Constructing a nuclear warhead is no simple task; it
is exponentially more complicated than constructing
conventional bombs. However, given Iran’s determina-
tion, it is only a matter of time.

What many proponents of the JCPOA have repeat-
edly failed to recognize is that Iran has been dead
set on having a nuclear arsenal, no matter the cost.

After watching what happened in Libya and Iraq, Iran’s
leaders understand this is the only way for them to
guarantee their safety. In 2008, then-Libyan President
Moammar Gaddafi warned Iranians to abort their
nuclear program, saying that they would, “suff er the
same fate as Iraq.” Three years later, Gaddafi was
overthrown and brutally murdered after NATO inter-
vened to support a popular revolution against him.

North Korea’s offi cial news service promptly claimed
that by giving up his nuclear arms program, Gaddafi
had opened himself up to an invasion. While they
wisely remained silent on the issue, the Iranian regime
drew the same conclusions.

Alex Grinberg, an expert on Iran at the Jerusalem
Institute for Strategy and Security, says Iran has seen
the cause of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine on the
1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Ukraine gave
up its nuclear weapons in return for a worthless U.S.

guarantee of security.

Optimists suggest that if Iran were to get its nuclear
warheads, its leaders might relax their policy of
entrenchment through the arming, training and funding
of proxy groups like Hezbollah, Yemeni Houthis and
Shia militias. Yet while, of course, desirable, this is
unlikely. What is more apt to happen is Iran will join
nuclear regimes like Russia and North Korea in becom-
ing more aggressive globally precisely due to their new
confi dence.

Moreover, this tendency would only worsen once
Iranians can guarantee a second-strike option, with
either a nuclear submarine or hiding their stockpiles
deep in the mountains as they have previously done
with their nuclear facilities. Iran’s massive size and
numerous mountain ranges make that a likely option.

Iran is unlikely to use nuclear weapons, given the
potentially fatal consequences as a result. Nonetheless,
its nuclear threats must be taken seriously, as should
be the potential for accidents. During the Cold War,
on several occasions, the United States and Soviet
Union were almost accidentally plunged into nuclear
war, such as with the case of Vasili Arkhipov and
many other close calls. It is noteworthy that Moscow
and Washington have mutually consented to set a
communication line following the Cuban Missile Crisis
as the leadership of both countries realized the risks
of an undesired nuclear confl ict. Tehran has refused to
establish any kind of communication with Jerusalem,
even in the case of emergency alone. This only further
aggravates the risk.

Given the likelihood of a nuclear Iran, U.S. policy
should be aggressive containment and deterrence.

Iran must understand that if it uses a nuclear weapon —
even a tactical one — it will pay a large price, whether
through crippling cyberattacks, conventional strikes on
critical infrastructure or other means. There must be a
credible deterrent in place to Iran and any other rogue
nuclear power that breaking the nuclear taboo will
never be worth it.

But the threat of nuclear weapons goes beyond their
actual use. Nuclear weapons have always been a force
multiplier, and if Iran feels that its force is multiplied,
it will ramp up its subversive activities. Iran must also
be made to understand that the security it has from
invasion does not apply to its proxies, and that it will
be struck hard in reprisal for Iranian provocations.

Overall, the regime must be made to understand that
its nuclear weapons will not give it any advantages
outside of Iranian territory.

Additionally, the United States should ramp up
support for allies that would come under increased
threat from a nuclear Iran — i.e., Israel, Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates and Azerbaijan. If the United
States does not do so, these allies will likely turn to
Russia and China for protection, giving those nations
an even larger foothold in the Middle East and dimin-
ishing U.S. infl uence to almost zero.

Regardless of U.S. policy, Washington will have to
prepare for Saudi Arabia to seek to acquire nuclear
weapons, as it said it would once Iran does. The
United States may be able to prevent Riyadh from
proliferating by storing U.S. nuclear warheads on
Saudi soil; however, given the Biden administration’s
teetering relationship with the kingdom, it remains
unclear if there is enough trust on either side for this to
work. Saudi proliferation may then lead to Turkish and
Egyptian proliferation.

Unlike in Vladimir Putin’s Russia, where only he is
in charge of major decisions such as the deployment
of nuclear weapons, in Iran, they are more likely to
be taken by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
and the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps command
together. Considering that this decision would have to
be taken by such a large group whose consistent goal
has been invulnerability and survival, this is unlikely.

All the same, the force-multiplying ability of nuclear
weapons in Iranian foreign policy is extremely danger-
ous. If the United States is not ready to respond with
a robust policy to counter and protect its allies in the
region, it risks losing them. ■
Joseph Epstein is a legislative fellow at the
Endowment for Middle East Truth.

JEWISHEXPONENT.COM 15