opinion
There’s More to Rising Antisemitism
Than Joe Rogan’s Rants
Jonathan S. Tobin
T he timing was fortuitous,
even if the news was
depressing. A week
after an episode of the Joe
Rogan Experience featured
an antisemitic exchange between the host and
fellow podcaster Krystal Ball, the American Jewish
Committee released a new poll documenting the
fact that most Americans — Jewish and non-Jewish
— think that Jew-hatred is growing.

The survey, titled “The State of Antisemitism in
America 2022,” contains some sobering results about
a perception that hatred for Jews has increased,
even if most of it is hardly surprising. What’s more,
that opinion is shared by non-Jews as well as Jews,
though there are some diff erences in the data. But
it also shows us that many Jewish respondents are
often as clueless about what constitutes antisemi-
tism as their non-Jewish neighbors.

Yet given the fact of a consensus about something
this serious, what is most dismaying about this
problem is that those Jewish groups tasked with
dealing with it aren’t focused on the most danger-
ous aspects of the challenge. Even worse, too many
of those stating their concerns are directing their
energies towards responses that are either of little
use or actually counterproductive.

This isn’t the fi rst time that Rogan has produced
a podcast that validated antisemitic arguments.

Back in the fall, he hosted Pink Floyd frontman and
anti-Israel zealot Roger Waters, giving him an unchal-
lenged platform to advocate for the antisemitic BDS
movement, as well as hateful myths about Israel and
conspiracy theories that justify Palestinian terrorism.

This time, he and Ball rose in defense of Rep. Ilhan
Omar (D-Minn.) to justify her antisemitic smears that
claimed Jews were buying congressional support for
Israel, which led the new Republican majority in the
House of Representatives to boot her off the Foreign
Relations Committee — something the Democratic
leadership would not do.

Referencing her use of the standard theme about
Jews and money, in which she said support for the
Jewish state “was all about the Benjamins,” he said
the following: “That’s not an antisemitic statement.

Benjamins are money. The idea that Jewish people
are not into money is ridiculous. That’s like saying
Italians aren’t into pizza.”
The idea that Jews are “into” money any more
14 FEBRUARY 23, 2023 | JEWISH EXPONENT
than any other group is a stereotype, not a fact and
certainly not a serious argument. As many of Rogan’s
critics pointed out, Italians haven’t faced genocide
because of their connection to pizza. The issue is
not a stupid analogy. It’s the fact that the person who
hosts the most popular podcast on the Internet with
an estimated 11 million listeners for each episode is
not only willing to defend an antisemite, he is attempt-
ing to mainstream slanders of Jews and Israel.

The question to ask about this is not what should
be done about Rogan. Those who might try to cancel
or silence him over this will have the same lack of
success that others had when he previously off ended
mainstream liberal orthodoxy by hosting people who
contradicted popular, but often mistaken, beliefs about
the coronavirus pandemic and vaccines. Much like the
focus of groups like the Anti-Defamation League, who
are primarily interested in dealing with online hate by
censoring conservatives, that is a tactic that won’t work.

More importantly, as long as every Democrat in the
House of Representatives is ready to vote against
the GOP’s eff orts to do no more than slap Omar on
the wrist, the ability of such an antisemite to maintain
their mainstream status can’t be blamed on Rogan,
even if his infl uence shouldn’t be discounted.

The aftermath of Kanye (“Ye”) West’s public attacks
on Jews was similarly instructive about the futility
of concentrating fi re on celebrities who say bad
things. The willingness of former President Donald
Trump to host West at a Mar-a-Lago dinner with
other Jew-baiters like Nick Fuentes was justifi ably
condemned. Yet when others, like comedian Dave
Chappelle via his appearance as host of “SNL,”
reinforced some of the same antisemitic tropes as
West and tried to distract attention from African-
American violence against Jews, even as he mocked
the rapper/fashion mogul, it also illustrated just how
diffi cult it is to isolate and condemn sources of hate.

Nor should we fail to make the connection
between the way fashionable liberal opinion has
embraced ideas like intersectionality and critical
race theory, and the problem of growing antisemi-
tism. These concepts, which deem Jews and Israel
to be examples of “white privilege” who oppress
people of color, grant a permission slip for antisemi-
tism in academia, the media and in politics.

All of this makes it little wonder that the AJC poll
shows that Jews as well as non-Jews think antisem-
itism has not only increased but isn’t being taken as
seriously as other forms of hate and bigotry.

One can take some solace from the fact that
the number of Jews who say they have personally
encountered antisemitism either online or in person
is small. However, the mainstreaming of antisemitic
discourse explains why an ominously signifi cant
minority of Jews — 23%, almost one-quarter of an
entire people — say they sometimes seek to conceal
their Jewish identity.

Yet for all that, we know that Jewish legacy organi-
zations have, like so many other elements in our
society, become so thoroughly politicized that they
are more interested in partisan attacks on opponents
than condemning Jew hatred across the board. And
their eff orts at education against hate, particularly
with respect to the Holocaust, focus on anodyne
messages about kindness and all bigotry, rather than
seek to anathematize contemporary antisemitism in all
of its primary manifestations on the right, the left, and
among African-American and Muslim communities.

This also contributes to the confusion that some
Jews have about what constitutes antisemitism.

For example, both Jews and non-Jews overwhelm-
ingly believe that saying “Israel has no right to exist
is antisemitic.” Yet while that statement is backed by
87% of Jews and 90% of non-Jews, less than 40% of
both groups are willing to label the BDS movement
as antisemitic, as opposed to just having some
antisemitic supporters.

That’s partly a product of the ignorance the poll
demonstrates about the way anti-Zionism is merely
a thinly disguised version of antisemitism. But it’s
also a function of a political atmosphere in which
the intersectional left, which has embraced the BDS
movement, gets a pass because they are politically
aligned with Democrats or spout opinions that have
become commonplace in leading media outlets like
The New York Times.

So long as that is true — and so long as those who
purport to speak for the Jews, either in the Jewish
world or in politics — aren’t willing to draw a line
in the sand and declare that people like Omar and
other BDS supporters are beyond the pale in the
same way that West is now treated, don’t expect the
situation to improve.

Blame Joe Rogan all you like, but the real problem
about contemporary antisemitism isn’t what’s heard
on a podcast. It’s the ability of some Jew haters and
the popular ideologies they promote to be treated
as acceptable discourse. That’s the real reason for
troubling poll results that don’t tell us any more than
what we already know about 2023 America. ■
Jonathan S. Tobin is editor-in-chief of JNS (Jewish
News Syndicate).




opinion
We Must Prepare for
a Nuclear Iran
Joseph Epstein
Yagnik / AdobeStock
F or all intents and purposes, the Iranian nuclear
deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, is
dead. In December, Iranian offi cials said they had doubled
their capacity to enrich uranium. International Atomic
Energy Agency monitoring cameras were shut down
by the regime last May, and IAEA inspectors have
been banned from checking on the program. IAEA
offi cials say Iran has enriched 154 pounds of uranium to
60% purity. According to the head of the IAEA, Rafael
Grossi, that is enough to produce several weapons.

Iran can now enrich its uranium stockpile to 90%,
which is weapons-grade, within a few weeks. After
that, the regime only needs to place the enriched
uranium in a warhead and run a nuclear test to join the
league of nuclear rogue states like Russia and North
Korea. Barring a full-scale invasion of the country, or an
extremely unlikely coup or revolution, this will happen.

Constructing a nuclear warhead is no simple task; it
is exponentially more complicated than constructing
conventional bombs. However, given Iran’s determina-
tion, it is only a matter of time.

What many proponents of the JCPOA have repeat-
edly failed to recognize is that Iran has been dead
set on having a nuclear arsenal, no matter the cost.

After watching what happened in Libya and Iraq, Iran’s
leaders understand this is the only way for them to
guarantee their safety. In 2008, then-Libyan President
Moammar Gaddafi warned Iranians to abort their
nuclear program, saying that they would, “suff er the
same fate as Iraq.” Three years later, Gaddafi was
overthrown and brutally murdered after NATO inter-
vened to support a popular revolution against him.

North Korea’s offi cial news service promptly claimed
that by giving up his nuclear arms program, Gaddafi
had opened himself up to an invasion. While they
wisely remained silent on the issue, the Iranian regime
drew the same conclusions.

Alex Grinberg, an expert on Iran at the Jerusalem
Institute for Strategy and Security, says Iran has seen
the cause of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine on the
1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Ukraine gave
up its nuclear weapons in return for a worthless U.S.

guarantee of security.

Optimists suggest that if Iran were to get its nuclear
warheads, its leaders might relax their policy of
entrenchment through the arming, training and funding
of proxy groups like Hezbollah, Yemeni Houthis and
Shia militias. Yet while, of course, desirable, this is
unlikely. What is more apt to happen is Iran will join
nuclear regimes like Russia and North Korea in becom-
ing more aggressive globally precisely due to their new
confi dence.

Moreover, this tendency would only worsen once
Iranians can guarantee a second-strike option, with
either a nuclear submarine or hiding their stockpiles
deep in the mountains as they have previously done
with their nuclear facilities. Iran’s massive size and
numerous mountain ranges make that a likely option.

Iran is unlikely to use nuclear weapons, given the
potentially fatal consequences as a result. Nonetheless,
its nuclear threats must be taken seriously, as should
be the potential for accidents. During the Cold War,
on several occasions, the United States and Soviet
Union were almost accidentally plunged into nuclear
war, such as with the case of Vasili Arkhipov and
many other close calls. It is noteworthy that Moscow
and Washington have mutually consented to set a
communication line following the Cuban Missile Crisis
as the leadership of both countries realized the risks
of an undesired nuclear confl ict. Tehran has refused to
establish any kind of communication with Jerusalem,
even in the case of emergency alone. This only further
aggravates the risk.

Given the likelihood of a nuclear Iran, U.S. policy
should be aggressive containment and deterrence.

Iran must understand that if it uses a nuclear weapon —
even a tactical one — it will pay a large price, whether
through crippling cyberattacks, conventional strikes on
critical infrastructure or other means. There must be a
credible deterrent in place to Iran and any other rogue
nuclear power that breaking the nuclear taboo will
never be worth it.

But the threat of nuclear weapons goes beyond their
actual use. Nuclear weapons have always been a force
multiplier, and if Iran feels that its force is multiplied,
it will ramp up its subversive activities. Iran must also
be made to understand that the security it has from
invasion does not apply to its proxies, and that it will
be struck hard in reprisal for Iranian provocations.

Overall, the regime must be made to understand that
its nuclear weapons will not give it any advantages
outside of Iranian territory.

Additionally, the United States should ramp up
support for allies that would come under increased
threat from a nuclear Iran — i.e., Israel, Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates and Azerbaijan. If the United
States does not do so, these allies will likely turn to
Russia and China for protection, giving those nations
an even larger foothold in the Middle East and dimin-
ishing U.S. infl uence to almost zero.

Regardless of U.S. policy, Washington will have to
prepare for Saudi Arabia to seek to acquire nuclear
weapons, as it said it would once Iran does. The
United States may be able to prevent Riyadh from
proliferating by storing U.S. nuclear warheads on
Saudi soil; however, given the Biden administration’s
teetering relationship with the kingdom, it remains
unclear if there is enough trust on either side for this to
work. Saudi proliferation may then lead to Turkish and
Egyptian proliferation.

Unlike in Vladimir Putin’s Russia, where only he is
in charge of major decisions such as the deployment
of nuclear weapons, in Iran, they are more likely to
be taken by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
and the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps command
together. Considering that this decision would have to
be taken by such a large group whose consistent goal
has been invulnerability and survival, this is unlikely.

All the same, the force-multiplying ability of nuclear
weapons in Iranian foreign policy is extremely danger-
ous. If the United States is not ready to respond with
a robust policy to counter and protect its allies in the
region, it risks losing them. ■
Joseph Epstein is a legislative fellow at the
Endowment for Middle East Truth.

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